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ABSTRACT 
Islamophobia is on the rise and is now a sentiment that has transcended 
almost every European country. In the aftermath of 9/11 and the subsequent 
bombings in Madrid and London, anxiety and fear of the “other” has been 
heightened. This fear has been harnessed by political parties in many European 
countries, most notably Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and 
France. These countries all have supported political parties that have formed an 
anti-Muslim platform. The main claim is that the “Islamic identity” is incompatible 
with the “European identity”. Despite these xenophobic attitudes, the immigration 
population still inhabits European countries and continues to grow. An intense 
debate has ensued about the immigration and integration polices within many 
European countries. Immigration policies in general are being reexamined in the 
rise of this discourse.  
My thesis examines the issues and questions surrounding the conflict of 
foreigners in Europe. Through my research I have found that the issue of Muslim 
immigrants in Europe is particularly problematic and complex. My paper seeks to 
outline the immigration and integration policies in Europe and to compare the 
difference in circumstances in Southern and Northern Europe. I have focused on 
Spain as a sample country for Southern Europe, and Denmark as a sample country 
for Northern Europe. While my findings and conclusions are by no means true for all 
Southern or Northern European countries, there is evidence of general trends for 
each region. My thesis is framed by this comparison but what it really analyzes is 
why countries have such a challenge with the successful integration of immigrants. I 
look towards historical imperial legacies, 20th century migration trends, 
geographical location, the legal systems, and the construction of national identities. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISLAM AND EUROPE 
1.1   Ancient traces of the Euro-Islam Relationship: 
Henri Pirenne was a Belgian philosopher who lived from 1862-1935. One of 
his most interesting works appeared posthumously in 1937, Mohemet et 
Charlemange (Mohammed and Charlemagne). The “Pirenne thesis” suggests that the 
fall of the Roman Empire cannot be attributed to the broadly recognized idea that 
Germanic tribes triumphed over Constantinople. He asserts that this major shift in 
Europe was the result of the rise of Islam across North Africa, Spain, and Portugal, 
which destabilized the Mediterranean Sea and thus weakened the Roman Empire. 
Accordingly, Pirenne argues that, “without Islam, the Frankish Empire would have 
probably never existed, and Charlemagne, without Muhammad, would be 
inconceivable.”1 Some modern intellectuals reference “Pirenne’s thesis” to illustrate 
the historically mutual relationship between Europe and Islam because the rule of 
Charlemagne unified much of Western and Central Europe and provided a 
foundation of fortitude in future centuries.2 It is undeniable that European and 
Islamic nations have been engaged in the historical borrowing of culture, 
technology, and social constructs. Since the growth of Islam in the 700’s both states 
have coexisted while inevitable contributing to one another.  
An excellent example of this is seen in the founding of the Bayt al hikma in 9th 
century Baghdad by the caliph Al-ma mun. Bayt al hima, or “house of wisdom” 
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focused on translating Greek and Indian texts of philosophy, astronomy, medicine, 
and mathematics. This included the work of Grecian intellectuals such as Aristotle, 
Plato, Pythagoras, and the Indian intellectual, Chakara. This movement marked a 
revival of Greek culture and thought. The Islamic civilization was the first to unravel 
the ways of the Greeks. These transcriptions were later used by Italian academics 
who transmitted the Arabic text into Italian. Once translated into Italian, the 
information was accessible throughout Europe and greatly influenced all Western 
thinkers of the time.3  
Bassam Tibi believes that neither civilization, Europe and Islam, would be at 
the capacity they are today without enrichment from the other, but he does not 
neglect the detrimental aspects of the relationship and references to Jihad conquest, 
crusades, and the era of colonialism. He sums up the relationship as one of a 
“century-long mutual ‘Threat and Fascination’”.4 A captivating observation is that 
the Golden Age of Islam overlaps with the Dark Ages of Europe. 
1.2   The Age of Imperialism: 
This relationship between Europe and Islam took a sharp turn with the 
coming of the “Age of Imperialism” and European colonialism. In the 17th century 
mercantilism began to sweep through Africa. Many European nations sought access 
to and control of foreign markets. A common goal was to circumnavigate the 
continent of Africa, and a long the way many European powers set up ports along 
the coasts. This planted the seed for the slave trade and ultimately, colonialism. 
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European colonialism officially began after the Berlin Conference of 1885, which 
specified the allocation of African lands to different European powers. Great Britain 
and France were the knights of the colonial era and conquered many African states 
throughout the continent and extended their imperialistic rule to the East, to include 
India, Pakistan, Lebanon, among many more.5 The period of colonialism had 
momentous effects in the Muslim world. European colonists “recarved” Arab 
territories to advance colonial pursuits and to make the regions more governable. 
Because these new divisions only had European interests in mind, they often 
exacerbated existing “ethnic, linguistic, and religious tensions as in the case of 
Lebanon, Pakistan, Palestine, and Malaysia”6. To cause further disruption, the 
colonial commanders commonly eradicated century-old institutions such as the 
Sharia court of law and the system of waqf. Both were essential pillars of Islamic 
society but were replaced with Europeanized structures of law and government. It 
has been suggested that actions such as these, “planted the seeds for future 
fundamentalist reaction against governments in a number of Islamic countries 
which, due to the abolition of the Shari‘a courts and the adoption of European legal 
codes, were now no longer seen as following and implementing Islamic law.”7 
The era of colonialism is often blamed for the birth of the concept of the 
“other” that provided the logic behind asserting European power in the global south. 
As Europeans encountered people and civilizations from other regions they began 
to develop ideologies and opinions about these people previously unfamiliar to 
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them. This became a topic of interest to many scientists and intellectuals of the time. 
New disciplines and sectors of science emerged as people attempted to rationalize 
and categorize the differences between Europeans and the “others”—Africans, 
Asians, and Arabs, American Indians, etc. The study of natural history and the 
“naturalists” began to classify the human and use the term “homo sapiens”. 
Distinguishing factors in classifying different “types” or “varieties” were not just 
based on skin color, but also included habits, shape of the head, stature, language, 
and location of origin, along with many others. Thinkers such as Hume, Bernier, 
Voltaire, and Gobineau wrote that Africans were inferior to whites from a scientific 
position, or what is now seen as an early anthropological position. The Age of 
Exploration gave rise to the term race, racism, and some of its implications in 
society today. In part, the xenophobic attitude towards Arabs and Muslims seen 
today in Europe has roots in the ideologies created during this era.  
The Age of Imperialism is also responsible for the first wave of substantial 
immigration into Europe from the Asian and African regions during the 
decolonization period during the second half of the 20th century. Most countries that 
had colonies granted access to their ex-colonial subjects as “citizens of the former 
colonies, with certain sets of rights associated with their status.”8 The end of 
colonial rule also caused “several million civil servants who had been working for 
the colonial administration, as well as soldiers and European settlers, to emigrate 
from the former colonies.”9 The sentiment towards the incoming ex-colonials 
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differed in each country and, as expected, some were much more congenial than 
others. In the case of Dutch colonies, for example Indonesia, all Indonesian’s were 
granted Dutch citizenship and regardless is they immigrated to the Netherlands or 
not, they were still classified as Dutch citizens. The UK approached the situation 
with more prudence, which has been attributed to their greater number of former 
colonial subjects and an undertone of racism. While most colonial powers offered 
some sense of citizenship or access in the post-colonial period, eventually “the 
receiving societies tried to minimize and finally end the regulations that gave post-
colonial migrants (relatively) easy access to the country.”10 
Perhaps the most consequential wave of migration was the movement of 
laborers. The flow consisted of a South to North movement of foreign workers to 
compensate for the post-war labor demands. The Second World War left behind a 
shortage of domestic labor during the time of European reconstruction and 
industrial growth, specifically in mining, textiles, and auto industries11. Many of the 
migrants were from the Mediterranean countries, including, Spain, Italy, Greece, and 
Portugal. Many former colonial powers recruited labor forces from their former 
colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. Migrants “Immigrants from former 
colonies were able to take advantage of the open policy towards labor migration and 
special rights (including in some cases full citizenship rights).12 In the 1970’s 
industrial growth had become stagnant and processes of deindustrialization 
reduced the labor market, especially in the fields that provided the low-skilled and 
                                                        
10 Van Amersfoot 
11 Van Amersfoot 
12 Triandafyllidou, Gropas, 1 
 6 
physical jobs held by many migrants. This, combined with the oil crisis, created a 
precarious economic situation caused a halt in labor recruitment and guest worker 
programs, and “after 1973, all countries ended or sharply reduced labor 
migration.”13 
Guest worker programs were intended to be temporary, with the expectation 
that men would come to Europe for a few years, make money, save money and then 
return home. “While many of these immigrant workers indeed returned to their 
country of origin after some years, a considerable fraction eventually settled in the 
receiving societies and brought their families over, thereby raising important social 
and political challenges for integration that EU Member States continue to face 
today.”14 
 Asylum seekers have also contributed to the immigrant, and specifically 
Muslim immigrant, populations in Europe today. The 1990’s brought on an asylum 
crisis in many EU countries that caused an over flow of refugees from North Africa 
and the Middle East. There has been an attempt by many EU countries to restrict the 
inflow and aid to refugees, but according to agreements n the Geneva Convention, 
they are obligated to certain quotas. Asylum seekers have been one of the largest 
group of Muslim immigrants in the past 20 years. 
1.3   The Impact of Globalization and the Digital Age: 
The processes of globalization in the 20th and 21st century have transcended 
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and transformed every aspect of society. While the term globalization has a variety 
of implications, in the relation to Europe and Islam it can be defined as “process 
whereby individual lives and local communities are affected by economic and 
cultural forces that operate worldwide.”15 Globalization has effectively “divided the 
world into a ‘center’ (USA) and a ‘periphery’, enabling the former to impose its 
values on the rest.”16 
While globalization has injected Western influence into Islamic states, it also 
has mobilized Muslim ideologies to reach a global scale. According to recent UN 
statistic, Islam is the world’s second largest religion (21%) and exponentially 
growing. Since 1989, in Europe Islam has increased 142.35%, and has an average 
annual growth rate of 6.4%. This is compared to the 1.46% annual growth rate of 
Christianity. The growing access to technology has contributed to this expansion. 
This has allowed Muslims who have immigrated to Western countries to remain 
informed and involved with the Muslim communities in their home countries. 
Technology has also delivered Muslim ideas and movements into Europe. Many 
networks have been created that provide a platform for opinions, updates, and 
collectivity to Muslims abroad. Interconnectedness has increased the capabilities of 
terrorist organizations through global communication strategies. While 
globalization has increased the mobility of good, labor, and ideas, it has created an 
immeasurable degree of boundless information exchange that impacts social and 
political systems. 
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CHAPTER TWO: SPAIN 
2.1   Immigration & Identity in Spain: 
Of all the European countries, Spain arguably has the most intricate 
relationship to Islam. Al-Andalus was the Muslim territory along the Iberian 
Peninsula established by the Umayyad caliphate in the 8th century. Dr. Ghazanfar 
describes, the capital city, Cordoba, as “Europe's largest [center]—the city of books, 
of patrons of great literary figures and of men who were explorers of knowledge. 
There existed no separation between science, wisdom, and faith; nor was East 
separated from the West, nor the Muslim from the Jew or the Christian. It was here 
that the European Renaissance began and flourished beyond.”17 While there was 
synergy within the state, on going tensions ensued with Christian kingdoms 
boarding the north. This led to the eventual decline of the Muslim state in Spain, 
beginning with the conquering of Toledo in 1085 and the consequent fall of Cordoba 
in 1236. Despite the elimination of Islamic hegemony in the region, there still are 
existing vestiges of the Muslim state in Spanish culture and society.18  
Islamic heritage can be found throughout Spain in both tangible and in 
tangible ways. Presumably, the province of Andalusia has the most illustrious 
echoes of Islam in the architecture of many mosques and now-converted churches. 
Islamic architecture has been key in maintaining the Muslim legacy. With Byzantine 
and Sassanid influences, it is very striking compared to more traditional European-
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styled buildings. Today there are about 200 mosques in Spain, 50 of them in 
Andalucía, but this is only a fraction of the 1,600 that once stood in Cordoba alone.19 
There are many other Islamic traces in Spain, “From architecture to cuisine to the 
most common vocabulary — including the ubiquitous olé, a distant relative of Allah 
— the country's Muslim past is deeply woven into its present.”20 There are many 
other things within Spanish culture that is reminiscent of the Islamic Golden that 
that is not even recognized as such because it has become so engrained throughout 
the centuries.  
While Spain has a deeply historical relationship with Islam there have been 
contemporary developments that have continued to shape the Muslim population in 
Spain today. Migration in Spain has followed a slightly different model than most of 
the Northern European countries. Until the 1980’s Spain was better characterized as 
a country of emigration, not immigration. Spain has had a more recent influx of 
Muslim immigrants, in part due to Spain’s economic boom of the 2000’s. This led to 
demands of labor in almost every industry. Though this influx of Muslim 
immigration occurred almost 50 years later in Spain than it did in Northern 
European countries (Germany, France, UK) it still follows the trend of immigration 
driven by labor shortages. “While it is certainly true that Spain is a country of 
‘recent’ immigration, it is also a fact that the sheer speed and volume with which 
migration flows have increased over the past decade have transformed Spain into 
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one of the largest receivers of immigrants in the world.”21 (see Figure 1) The 
immigrant population “leapt from about 500,000 in the mid-1990s to approximately 
5 million by 2009”22. Of the 5 million immigrants around 25% are from Muslim 
countries. While Spain has a very large inflow of Muslim immigrants there are still a 
number of native Spanish Muslims, second-generation Muslims, and Muslim 
converts, but still 90% of the Spanish Muslims ore foreign nationals. An estimated 1-
1.4 million Muslims live in Spain today.23 
 
Figure 124. This illustrates the acute increase of migrants into Spain after 2000. 
Spain has an issue in finding a balance between regionalism and nationalism 
and the Spanish constitution seeks to find a hybrid between the two ideologies. 
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Plurality in Spain is not a new concept and dates back to the times even before the 
Umayyad caliphate. Nationalism has not existed in Spain as it has in other European 
countries such as Italy, Germany, and Denmark (all of which have politically 
organized behind a nationalist conviction). The greatest expression of Spanish 
nationalism was embodied by a “climate of national Catholicism that would resist 
secularization until the 1960’s.”25 Instead, regional sentiments have proved 
dominant and have formed distinctive identities around language, territory, social 
structure, local economies, and overarching culture. 
Perhaps the greatest regional sentiment exists in Catalonia. Even though 
Catalonia is not an independent state, the shared history, identity and culture of the 
Catalan people brands Catalonia as a nation. While Andalucia is the historical 
Islamic capital, the Catalonian region has become the core region of the Muslim 
population today. Barcelona, the capital and largest city in Spain, has a very 
concentrated Muslim population. While about 70% of Muslims throughout Spain 
have Moroccan origins26, the main Muslim communities in Barcelona have origins in 
Pakistan. Within the city, there is a particular district, Ciuata Vella, where the 
Muslim population has settled. 27  
2.2   Integration Policy and Policy Making in Spain: 
Since the first wave of immigration in Europe in the 1950’s, countries have 
realized the importance of implementing integration programs.  When Spain’s 
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migrant pattern was inverted from the long-standing emigration trend to 
immigration in the 1970’s, there was a need to create legislation regarding the 
immigration—at that time in Spain there was none. Spain was scheduled to enter 
the European Community (an early model of the EU) in 1986, and the legislation 
needed to mirror aspects of other European immigration policies, such as the 
“German typology”28. At this time most of the immigrants were laborers, with the 
exception of some refugees, so immigration law essentially became labor law. “In 
1985, Spain's first law, the Ley de Extranjería, or the Law on the Rights and Freedoms 
of Foreigners in Spain, approached most immigration as temporary phenomenon, 
and focused primarily on control over migrants already in the country. Immigrants 
were broadly conceptualized, first and foremost, as workers who required 
regulation by the Ministry of Labor.”29  
What resulted was client politics. The state condoned undocumented 
migration to aid support the certain “business sectors suffering from low 
productivity and threatened by outside competition. But while tolerated, the 1985 
legislation consigned migrant workers to illegality, excluding them from social 
services and labor protection... Overall then, immigration and integration policies 
pre-2000 were ‘defined by government officials as a delicate balancing act. They feel 
that they must maintain enough control over illegal flows to prevent the number of 
foreigners (especially from Third World countries) from growing too rapidly and 
provoking a xenophobic backlash, while simultaneously supplying a low-cost labor 
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force that is adequate to keep the economy growing and attracting foreign 
investment’”30  
The party division between the Socialist Party and the Partido Popular (PP) 
began to affect legislation in 2000. The Socialist Party (PECI) and various other 
parties supported the Law on the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and 
their Integration (Law 4/2000). It was monumental for its policy shift that included 
integration, but more importantly its ideological shift. Not only was there a coalition 
of parties supporting it (this excluded the Partido Popular) but also it recognized 
two key aspects of immigration. First, that it was not a temporary labor issue, 
people were migrating to Spain and staying. Secondly, due to the permanence of the 
immigrants it focused more broadly on the process of integration.31 But, upon 
winning the majority, the PP amended Law 4/2000, criticizing it for its leniency and 
discord with the rest of the EU’s conservative policies and passed Law 8/2000 
which retracted progress made toward integration efforts. 
The Partido Popular maintained a similar position in the new 2003 
integration, plan called the GRECO plan, that focused on four objectives: 1. Global, 
coordinated design of immigration as a desirable phenomenon for Spain, as a 
member of the European Union; 2. Integration of foreign residents and their families 
as active contributors to the growth of Spain; 3. Admission regulation to ensure 
peaceful coexistence within Spanish society, and 4. Management of the shelter 
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scheme for refugees and displaced persons.32 The GRECO plan was progressive for 
two reasons and almost was as if the PP was leaning towards a compromise. First, 
the plan was more stimulating because it provided funding. Second, it recognized 
the responsibility of regional governments in the integration of immigrants. But, 
GRECO still fell within the PP’s restrictive stance. Upwards of 500 million euros 
were budgeted for the integration portion of the policy, and were used “on 
operations to enforce border control, the creation of internment centers and asylum 
processing. In reality, actual integration policies made up only about 10 per cent of 
the total GRECO budget”33. The policy still did not acknowledge the permanence of 
immigration and still focused on the return to countries of origin. 
 After the Socialist government came to power in 2004, a new approach to the 
immigration and integration puzzle emerged. The PECI instated a regularization 
measure that legalized approximately 700,000 migrants sustaining the ‘no 
integration without legality’ approach. The PP and many EU members fiercely 
criticized this. There may have been altruism in this decree but the additional 118 
million euros collected the following year were also agreeable with the new socialist 
led government.34 The Socialist party has also created a department within the 
government exclusively assigned to integration issues. It cites the Spanish 
Constitution, as well as international human rights laws, and EU stipulations. 
Perhaps most significant is the departments emphasis on the role of “autonomous 
communities in integration efforts. To that effect, the Socialist government began 
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dispersing money to the autonomous communities towards reception, integration 
and additional educational funding in 2005.”35  
2.3   A Two-Fold Divide in Spain: 
 Unfortunately, the two major political parties have been unable to establish 
solidarity over the issue of immigration and integration. The Partido Popular has 
maintained a conservative and security-centered ideology in terms of rhetoric “but 
in terms of application it can be more aptly described as a market-based approach 
which allowed the incorporation of increasingly large numbers of irregular migrant 
into the informal economy.”36 While the Socialist Party granted citizenship to many 
informal immigrants, the PP would rather maintain their illegal status as to avoid 
providing the group with welfare services.  
As the opposition party, the PP has proposed a new integration policy with 
strong influences of Sarkozy’s French Immigration and Integration law, under which 
immigrants must “‘obey the laws, to respect Spanish customs, to learn the language, 
to pay his taxes and to work actively to integrate himself…In return, Spanish society 
would give the immigrant ‘the same rights and privileges as a Spanish citizen’ and to 
respect his or her ‘beliefs and customs as long as they are not contrary to any 
Spanish laws’.”37 
The Socialist Party tackled the issue very differently. It has adopted a 
philosophy “inspired by worker and human rights—‘no integration without 
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legality’”.38 This was best displayed in the massive regularization of 700,000 
irregular workers. The PECI has taken a platform that supports these workers by 
providing necessary welfare services in exchange for their incorporation into the 
formal economy. The Socialist Party also has provided more sufficient funding to the 
autonomous communities to support their integration programs. The one consensus 
between the two parties is that the autonomous states play a vital role in the 
integration of their immigrant populations, “based on the territorial organization of 
the Spanish state, and its political and administrative decentralization.”39 Despite 
their reservations in providing funding, the PP is explicit in both 2000 laws and the 
GRECO plan, “in their recognition that it is the development and implementation of 
integration policies at the local level that will have the greatest impact on 
integration”.40 The one area that the two parties can agree on is that immigration 
controls are within the domain of the national government and integration policies 
are in the domain of the autonomous regions.  
There has been a high degree of dysfunction due to the incoherence between 
the autonomous regions and the central government in Spain. The policies of 
immigration and integration are disconnected and have been assigned to different 
sectors of the state. Historically, the immigration policies were in the hands of the 
national government and the integration policies were left up to the regional 
leaders. The set of entry laws were inconsistent with the demands for labor, which 
caused erratic migrant trends that were resolved by numerous regularization 
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programs. (“Between 1985 and 2005, six exceptional regularization processes were 
implemented in Spain”41). “In contrast to entry policies, regularization programs—
which, in practice, have been the primary avenue for conferring legal status—have 
come as the result of bottom-up pressures exerted in great measure by social actors 
as well as by regional and local governments.”42  
The autonomous states have little or no control over the entry quotas but are 
accountable for the integration of large number of migrants, which have caused 
local plans to “be reactive in nature, focusing on preventing serious problems 
(marginality, violence, insecurity, exploitation, etc.)”.43 This has caused regions to 
default to a ‘bottom-up’ approach and is mainly supported by civil groups. Their 
efforts can be seen in “policymaking by explicitly demanding that public 
administrations develop integration schemes” and also by being the “frontline 
providers of basic services for immigrants since the very beginning of their 
settlement in Spain during the mid-1980s.”44 With little or no national guidance and 
the growing demands of migrants, the autonomous states have fulfilled the void and 
have developed integration initiatives. “This has resulted in great variety in the 
form, content, involvement of relevant actors and implementation of local and 
regional policies. Above all, diversity in policymaking processes has led to 
considerable inequalities across regions and cities, particularly since more 
empowered autonomous communities tend to develop their own policies, but 
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others do not.”45 Autonomous states with a strong sense of pride and identity tend 
to be more structured in general which streams into more structured integration 
plans. An example of a strong regional community that fervently promoted 
integration policies is Catalonia, which will be elaborated on in the following 
section.  
This variance between a national perspective and a regional perspective is 
ingrained in Spanish society has become evident in many ways. The two domains 
often have different motives and objectives. In terms of the immigration and 
integration issue,  “The two separate spheres follow divergent logics: the national 
government endeavors to restrict the entrance of migrants, while the autonomous 
communities and municipalities seek to make irregular migrants visible so as to 
develop policies that improve their living situation. Although the policy areas 
operate separately from one other, developments in the sphere of integration are 
hierarchically determined by those in migration.”46 The Spanish have tackled a 
treated the immigration/integration issue as if it were two distinct matters, while in 
reality the two issues need to be addressed simultaneously; immigration policies 
need to be created and enforced in tandem with integration policies.  
2.4   Catalonia, the pioneer: 
 Catalonia has a very tumultuous history that can attributed to the regions 
desire to maintain an independent identity and Spain’s desire to incorporate the 
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state into a unified nation. The greatest suppression of Catalonia occurred under the 
Franco regime. One of the most important characteristics to the region is the Catalan 
language and this specific issue alone has been a source of huge contention. The 
early struggles towards Catalonian nationalism has led to a legacy of social activism 
and the emergence of strong political factions within the region. In fact, social and 
cultural integration has been a notion in Catalonia since the 1950’s.47 Catalonia 
spearheaded the integration movement by creating aa integration strategy in 
199348—years before integration was mentioned in national legislation. 
 In the 1980’s the Convergència i Unió (CiU) party, led by President Jordi 
Pujol, constructed a Catalan national project (Fer Pais) that included an integration 
proposal. Fer Pais was “couched in an overtly civic and inclusive language which 
invited both autochthonous and immigrant communities to take part. This was 
symbolized by the definition the Catalan government used to define what it was to 
be Catalan, which ‘is anyone who lives and works in Catalonia, and wants to be 
Catalan’ (Pujol)”49. Assimilation was very important to this approach. As previously 
mentioned, the Catalan language was a key attribute of society and was the spoken 
language. Assimilation also stressed the philosophy of equality—equal rights and 
equal responsibilities. This meant that newcomers had full access to welfare state 
services and also an effort was made refrain from immigrant-specific services.50  
This Fer Pais sentiment was developed in the 1980’s—a very different era of 
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migration. “Immigrants in this context refer to any ‘newcomer’ to Catalonia, but in 
the early days this was more directed to non-Catalan Spanish citizens, as their 
numbers were far higher than non-Spanish immigrants.”51 While Pujol’s same 
philosophy still exists today, the acceptance and actual implications look very 
different. In reality, the Catalonian government originally created a plan that was 
geared towards inter-Spain migration. This is not to say that this plan sought to 
exclude foreigners, but the fact is the foreigner population (which was mainly 
European) was relatively politically inconsequential. “While the model was always 
sold as one that did not problematize people as a priori ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’, the 
line became blurred when applied to Muslim immigrants as opposed to 
Andalusians.”52 While the CiU’s 2001 immigration plan has maintained the original 
philosophy by “underscoring Catalonia’s support of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, right to health care, education, housing, right of association, protest, 
meeting and labor rights” it also “insisted that ‘foreign citizens’ understand and 
accept that while Catalonia forms part of the Spanish state, it also constitutes a 
nation with its own identity”53. Despite the recent evolutions of the policy due to 
new migrant situation, Catalonia is still a paragon for regional integration policies. It 
has even been argued that the early “national plan showed striking similarities to 
the former plan in its institutional structure, particularly in terms of instruments 
promoting interdepartmental cooperation and social participation”54. 
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2.5   Post 11-M: 
The Muslim population in Spain has already been described as both a 
historical and contemporary dimension. In 2004, the relationship between Islam 
and Spain reached a new level. On March 11th Muslim extremists killed 192 people 
and wounded 1,800 by bombing four commuter trains the Cercanías transportation 
system. Muslim extremism, terrorism, jihad, Al Qaeda—these were all phrases that 
had entered everyday conversations after the World Trade Center attacks of 2001. 
These phrases were now being applied to Spain as the global community shifted 
their attention to Europe. The terrorist group responsible for the bombings was 
linked to an Al Qaeda-affiliated, Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group. Authorities 
have been able to issue a profile of those involved in the attacks: “most were first-
generation immigrants, and many, but not all, had belonged to jihadist groups well 
before coming to Spain. A few were well-educated, but most were not, and were 
employed in construction, small business, and other occupations typical of 
immigrants in Spain. Some had no jobs, and obtained money through petty theft and 
other criminal activities. Many were over 30 years old and were married.”55 Violent 
extremism is a campaign supported by a minute fraction of the Muslim population 
in Spain. Experts have estimated that Islamic radicals account for only 300-1,000 of 
the 1-1.4 million Muslims living in Spain.56 In response to Muslim extremism and 
terrorism, Spain has significantly amplified the integration of immigrants and 
Muslims into society.   
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While Islamic terrorism has been a prevalent concern in the past decade, 
Spain has been confronting the threat of domestic terrorism for over 40 years. The 
ETA (Basque Homeland Freedom) is the armed organization that has led the Basque 
National Liberation Movement in “a bloody campaign for independence for the 
seven regions in northern Spain and south-west France that Basque separatists 
claim as their own.”57 This movement has killed over 800 people and has catalyzed 
extensive counter-terrorism legislation and procedures. Through the involvement 
with the ETA, the Spanish government has become well versed in effective 
responses to extremism and terrorism.  
As previously demonstrated, Spain has had limited success with the creation 
and promotion of integration policies. The events of March 2004 changed this 
quickly. Since 2004 the Socialist Party has held power centralized under the Prime 
Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. Prime Minister Zapatero has emphasized the 
importance of a stimulated integration program and, “has been careful to note that 
he does not see a military solution to the problem of terrorism, preferring to focus 
on law enforcement cooperation and by pursuing an ‘alliance of civilizations’ with 
the Muslim world.”58 The government has pursued efforts that simultaneously 
promote immigrant integration and counters Muslim extremism. This follows the 
logic that if Muslims are being actively integrated and included in society, they are 
less likely to be drawn to marginalized groups, such as Islamic Extremists. 
Zapatero and the Socialist Party have instated drastic policy changes to the 
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Partido Popular rule. As previously mentioned, one of the highest contested policies 
was the legalization of many illegal laborers. In terms of security and integration the 
government sees the inclusion of immigrants into a legal framework very important. 
The documentation of citizens is seen as an imperative counter-terrorism tactic. 
There has also been a substantial expansion of government factions working 
exclusively with immigration and integration, as well as budget increases for these 
kinds of programs. “Over the period 2007-2010, the Ministry’s Strategic Plan for 
Citizenship and Integration was allocated about €2 billion (approximately $2.64 
billion) for programs related to immigrant education, employment, housing, social 
services, health, women, and youth.”59 Examples of other government-sponsored 
initiatives include a ‘Permanent Immigration Observatory’, which monitors and 
analyzes the temperament of immigrant communities and generates policy 
suggestions, and also a ‘Foundation for Pluralism and Co-Existence’ which  
”promotes societal dialogue and recognition of minority religious groups in Spain 
(Muslims, Jews, and Protestants), and funds selected integration projects”.60 
Another very crucial development was the conglomeration of the two major Muslim 
associations in Spain (FEERI and UCIDE) into a single political liaison, the Spanish 
Islamic Commission (CIE). The CIE is constantly under criticism for its insufficient 
representation of Spanish Muslims and some of these unsatisfied communities have 
proceeded to “create their own federations, some of them with a marked regional 
character”61. Despite the lack of centrality of these smaller federations, this 
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movement shows that the Muslim community seeks formal partnerships with the 
Spanish government. 
Another significant issue that needed to be addressed after the 2004 attacks 
was the number of ‘informal’ mosques. Spain has a relatively small number of 
mosques for the large Muslim population. This revealed that many Muslims worship 
in informal, unmarked prayer rooms, sometimes referred to as ‘garage mosques’.62 
“Experts estimate that there are hundreds of such ‘garage mosques’, headed by 
imams whose professional qualifications and political ideologies are unknown. 
Sarhane Ben Abdelmajid Farkhet, a key figure in the March 11 attacks, led prayers at 
one of these informal prayer rooms. These characteristics have made it difficult for 
Spanish authorities to monitor Muslim places of worship for jihadist supporters.”63 
Almost immediately following the attacks, measures were taken that would boost 
the cooperation between the State and the Muslim community. Because registration 
of religious institutions with the state is not mandatory the government 
(specifically, the Registry of Religious Entities at the Ministry of Justice) was limited 
in providing accurate information about mosques, their location, and affiliation. This 
has been a project of the newly established ‘Foundation for Pluralism and Co-
Existence’. “In order to encourage the inscription of mosques and religious 
associations in the Registry, the Government initiated a policy of funding projects 
made by religious communities.”64 This is a perfect example of the dual approach 
that encourages Muslim inclusion and also helps to monitor and curb extremism.  
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2.6   Conclusion about Spain:  
 Integration in Spain was viewed as a relatively inconsequential issue until 
recently. Even today, despite an intense increase in policy making, Spain lacks a 
coherent model of integration. The discord between the two widely supported 
political parties, and the constant struggled between regionalism and nationalism as 
made it difficult for newcomers to Spain to grasp what their duty is in terms of 
integrating themselves. In lieu of a national framework for integration, regional 
policies have emerged but fluctuate depending on the nature of the autonomous 
state. Catalonia has prevailed as a strong promoter of integration policies that have 
influenced other regional plans as well as early national plans.  
It was the tragic events of the March 2004 Madrid bombings that finally 
provoked a development of proactive integration policy. In the past, the programs 
have mostly been reactive on the side of the regional governments responding to 
the disassociated national immigration systems. While post-2004 legislation has 
been mainly a response to the Islamic extremism of a small percentage of Muslim 
immigrants, the legislation does not frame the integration applied exclusively to the 
Muslim community. “Given that most immigrants to Spain are from Latin America, 
some assert that the issue is across-the-board ‘immigration and integration’ rather 
than ‘Muslim immigration’ or ‘Muslim integration’.”65 The insufficiency of the 
Spanish integration model reflects Spain’s identity issue and complicates the 
character in which immigrants are supposed to relate to as a national archetype.  
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CHAPTER THREE: DENMARK 
3.1   Immigration into Denmark: 
19th century Danish nationalism established a strong sense of Danish identity 
within the relatively homogenous population of a mere 5.5 million. Denmark has 
hardly been considered a country of mass migration and historically experienced 
low immigration flows often from other Nordic and Western nations. However, 
since the 1970’s the status quo has been challenged by a growing number of 
immigrant’s mainly from Asian and African countries. This changeover began with 
the guest worker program, the consequential family reunification, and finally 
humanitarian migration and asylum seekers. “Today, non-naturalized immigrants 
and their descendants constitute six percent of the Danish population, whereas in 
1980 they made up just one percent.”66 This acute increase of immigrants has 
created a heightened awareness of foreigners in Denmark. The solidarity of the 
welfare state seems to be threatened by the apparent inconsistencies between the 
Danes and the newcomers.  
Compared to many other Northern European countries, Denmark has a 
rather mild colonial legacy. The first colony to be claimed by Denmark was in 
modern-day Estonia in the 13th century. Perhaps the most significant colonial 
territory was to the North when the Danish-Norwegian union took holdings of 
Greenland, the Faroe Islands, and Iceland. This has been one of the more significant 
colonial conquests because it still has prominent effects in both Denmark and 
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Greenland today. In terms of the general trend of colonialism, Denmark set up 
various trade posts along Africa’s Gold Coast, especially in present day Ghana, but 
mercantilism was the extent of a Danish imperial presence in Africa. Before the 
commencement of the Berlin Conference, Denmark had sold the majority of their 
trade posts to Great Britain and France. Denmark also had trade posts in India, and 
for a limited time had two small colonies. These, too, were sold off before the surge 
of colonial expansion.67 For the most part Denmark was disassociated from many 
aspects of the ‘Age of Imperialism’ and thus, Denmark had no colonial subjects to 
whom they owed a degree of citizenship, economic support, or aid for development 
and modernization. This sets Denmark apart from countries like Great Britain and 
France, who also have a disputed discourse with foreigners, and especially Muslims.  
 Denmark sidestepped the first significant wave of immigration that occurred 
in Europe during the period of decolonization because, as just mentioned, they had 
no significant colonies. However, Denmark was involved in the second large wave of 
migration into Europe—labor migration. Like most of Northern Europe, Denmark 
experienced an economic boom in the 1960’s and had a demand for labor that could 
not be fulfilled domestically. “From 1967 to 1970, around 18,000 foreign workers 
came to Denmark, primarily from Turkey, but also from Yugoslavia and Pakistan.”68 
Denmark had a relatively brief guest worker program. In alignment with many other 
European countries, after to the oil shock crisis Denmark implemented a ban on 
labor-driven immigration in 1973. At this time there were approximately 22,000 
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immigrants living in Denmark. While labor-based immigration was suppressed, 
foreign workers in Demark were allowed to reunite with their families, which 
prompted a low, but constant, flow of immigration through the 1970’s. By 1981, the 
number of foreign workers and their relatives increased to 30,000.69 
 Denmark has recognized asylum seekers and accepted refugees throughout 
the 20th century. The World Wars caused the first flow of refugees. Many eastern 
Europeans, Jews, and Germans, found refuge in Denmark. At this time many 
refugees integrated into Danish society smoothly. This seems to be attributed to 
cultural and religious similarities. A second wave of refugees was from Cold War 
conflict regions such as Vietnam and Chile, but the number of asylum seekers was 
relatively low until the Middle Eastern conflicts that began in the 1980’s. Between 
1956 and 1984 a total of 12,500 refugees migrated to Denmark. Comparatively, 
between 1984 and 1997 more than 73,000 refugees migrated to Denmark.70 During 
the 80’s refugees were generally from Iran, Iraq, Gaza, and the West Bank and the 
90’s brought refugees from Somalia and Bosnia.71 The high volume of humanitarian 
immigration beginning in the mid-1980’s is what really tipped the scale. Previously, 
most newcomers were from the EU or other western countries. These new refugees 
dramatically increased the population of those with “difference” or “otherness” 
within Denmark. Denmark in the 1990’s faced the reality of a mixed population, new 
ethnicities, religions, customs, and social norms. In response to the obvious 
population transformation, the 1990’s began a period aggressive reform.  
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3.2   Immigration Policy Reform: 
 While the migrant population grew, so did the concern over the issue. From 
1985 to 2000 the total number of foreign citizens in Denmark increased from 2% to 
5%, which accounts of a quarter million people.72 Compared to other neighboring 
European countries this figure is low, for example Germany’s foreign population is 
9%, and Sweden 6%.73 The German population is 81 million, while the Danish 
population is only 5.8 million, thus Denmark has been hypersensitive to a change 
such as this one. Considerable attention was drawn to this issue by citizens, 
politicians, and the media. The political solution was two pronged; first, immigration 
laws were tightened and second, the integration policies were restructured. 
Through this new political agenda, a “more restrictive migration policy was in 
introduced, addressing what in Danish context was defined as ‘the failure of 
migration and integration policy’, as a majority of the migrant population remains 
on social welfare, lacking the necessary structural possibilities to integrate into 
Danish society.”74 Denmark sees migration and integration as intertwined issues 
that need synchronized agendas in order to be effective. 
The momentum of this issue grew significantly with the founding of the 
Danish People’s Party (also known as Dansk Folkeparti, DF) in 1995. The Danish 
Peoples Party completely changed the state of affairs in Denmark. The DF’s position 
is that Denmark has been too openhanded in terms of granting asylum and family 
reunification, and providing welfare services for newcomers. The party’s platform is 
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based on the preservation of the heritage of the Danish people, which is comprised 
by the monarchy, the Church of Denmark, the strong welfare system that promotes 
education and entrepreneurship, and the family. They also feel that in order to 
maintain their “Danish-ness”, strict criteria must be enforced that discourages non-
Western immigration. In 2002, the DF said, “Denmark is not a country open for 
immigration, and the DF will not accept that Denmark develops into a multi- ethnic 
society”75 The concept of multiculturalism is no longer an accepted method of 
integration, rather the DF insists that cultural assimilation is the only appropriate 
means of integration for admitted immigrants. “The leitmotif of the Danish People’s 
Party is a ‘Denmark for Danes’ policy, that is, an almost communitarian approach to 
policy making.”76 One of the key tools that the DF uses to appeal to the Danes is 
drawing attention to the claim of a strong Danish identity. According to the Danish 
People’s Party, immigrants are threatening the Danish identity and the vitality of the 
welfare state and something must be done about it. “The DPP is led by Pia 
Kjaersgaard, a former social worker in an old people's home. ‘We founded the party 
because of too many immigrants,’ she says… Denmark's Muslim population are the 
party's particular focus. There are many Muslims, it [the DF] says, who are unwilling 
to integrate and hostile to "Danish values" such as free speech.”77 
The immigration and integration debate in Denmark became vehement in the 
November 2001 elections that coincidentally followed the 9/11 attacks. As soon as 
the Danish People’s Party emerged, the press played a big role and instigated the 
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issue. “The Danish press repeatedly used the ‘pressure cooker’ metaphor to explain 
how the lid had come off and allowed apparently very strong feelings to take center 
stage in migrant-related political debates.”78 As soon as the DF took a staunchly 
conservative position and made it the focal point of their campaign, the opposition 
parties had no choice but to mobilize a competing position incorporate it into their 
platforms. The issue was politicized and helped the DF gain considerable support.  
They reveled in a notable victory that increased their constituency from 7% in 1998, 
to 12% in 2001. This made the DF the third largest party in Danish Parliament.79 
National support for the DF has caused an international reaction that has labeled 
Denmark as racist and xenophobic. Further, the new stricter immigration laws have 
been accused of breaching human rights. One contested law regards family 
reunification through marriage. There has been an age requirement of 24 years old 
of both persons in order to be married. There also was a point system implemented 
that was designed to hinder immigrants receiving citizenship through marriage. 
These new pieces of legislation are just two of the efforts of the DF to restrict 
immigration. The DF has been highly criticized by left-wing Danish Parties, many EU 
countries, and by the international community in general.  
 It has been argued that the success of the Danish People’s Party is an 
indicator of a trend of dissatisfaction with the integration of immigrants that existed 
in Danish Society prior to 1995. The support of the Danish People’s Party is also 
coupled “by a large part of the Danish electorate [that] felt the formulation of a real 
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migrant incorporation policy had been too long in the making. Admittedly, 
policymakers have shrugged off the issue of migrant integration as something that 
would solve itself because Denmark was a particularly open and tolerant country 
with a long standing international reputation of humanism.”80 For the past two 
decades the Danish integration policy has been framed by multiculturalism. The 
majority of Danes, politicians and citizens, have recognized major flaws and a 
general failure of the multicultural approach to migrant integration. This has been 
attributed to the claim that multiculturalism undermines national social cohesion 
and, in turn, compromises cultural values.   
3.3   The Construction of the Danish Identity: 
The construction of the Danish identity, while extremely historical, has been 
amplified in recent years. The recent influx of immigrants has precipitated a strong 
reaction in Denmark. It seems as though the anxiety around the growing foreign 
population is fueled by fear of the Danish identity being diminished or even lost 
altogether. This, in part, can explain the xenophobic propensities that have emerged 
in Denmark. The Danish identity is closely tied to the welfare state, the Danish 
language, and the social cohesion of the society. These factors have not been 
exclusively threatened by the increase of foreigners, but more broadly by the 
consequences of globalization.  
 The Danish national identity is a social construct that has been brewed 
overtime but has had a persistent egalitarian undertone. A historical memory 
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reflected on with pride is the Battle of Dybbøl. This was a battle fought during the 
Second Schleswig War with Germany over the greatly disputed region of Southern 
Jutland in 1864. While the Germans conquered the Danish in this battle, the defeat 
helped forge the national identity. The Danes have commemorated this day, April 
18th, and celebrate a war in which they lost. What they celebrate is the elimination of 
all German speaking regions of the Danish Monarchy and the resilience of the 
soldiers who fought an unwinnable battle in the name of their Danish identity and 
pride. The annual tribute portrays that Danish are willing to sacrifice in order to 
maintain their sovereignty and selfhood. The loss of this war also germinated the 
nationalist renaissance.  
 After Denmark lost the Second Schleswig War, they shifted their focus under 
the motto “what is outwardly lost is inwardly won.”81 The period following the war 
can be categorized as resurgence in nationalism. N.F.S. Grundtvig was a very 
prominent figure in this movement. He was, among many things, most prominently 
the leader of the Danish education reform and founder of folk high schools—
’folkelig hojskole’, loosely interpreted as ‘a school that would be of and for the 
people’.82 “His vision was to create a unique school that would serve Danish people 
of all social standings, especially the farmers…and would give dignity to each person 
who attended. He wanted to awaken in each person a pride in Danish culture, and a 
love of learning that would continue for the person's entire life.”83 The folk high 
school system is still very prominent in Denmark today and still upholds Grundtvig’s 
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vision. In modern day Denmark, many young people still attend folk high schools. 
During my time studying in Copenhagen, I had an opportunity to visit a folk high 
school where some of my fellow American students had housing. Folk high schools 
are often situated outside of cities in more of suburban environments. In addition to 
dorm style living, students eat together at set meal times and share cooking and 
cleaning responsibilities. There are a number of intramural activities that are often 
mandatory to preserve the cooperative spirit. In my opinion, folk high schools have 
a role in the larger “Danish picture”. This type of communal and cooperative living is 
engrained in many young Danes during very formative years of their life. While 
there are a few exceptions, the opportunities for non-Danes to live in folk high 
schools is limited and therefore many young foreigners will never have the same 
cooperative foundation as young Danes.  
 Folk high schools represent a microcosm of the larger Danish welfare state. 
The philosophy behind the welfare state is not a new one and for the most part 
emerged out of the cooperative movement in Denmark in the late 19th century, the 
same movement that gave birth to folk high schools. The cooperative movement was 
very closely linked to the modernization and growth of the agricultural industry in 
Denmark. Cooperatives initially only included dairy farmers but soon grew to 
almost every agricultural field. “Regardless of the size of a particular farm, all 
farmers had only one vote at the general meetings—making the co-operative 
movement a shining example of Democracy at work”84. This agricultural cooperative 
is representative of two important current trends. Firstly, the egalitarian approach 
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to industry has proved successful as seen through the excessive agricultural 
exportations; Denmark produces food to supply three times their population.85 
Secondly, “The egalitarian attitude seen here in the co-operative movement is very 
much a part of the Danish national identity which rests on a firm belief that no one is 
better or more deserving than anyone else.”86  
 All “western” countries are welfare states to some degree. “There is a wide 
range of mixtures of arrangements for securing the weak citizens a minimal amount 
for their necessities. The weak inhabitants can be taken care of by the state, the local 
authorities, the family, labor market organizations, charity organizations, 
ecclesiastical institutions, private insurance etc.”87 The Danish welfare state is 
considered “big” because of the many services provided, for free, by the state. Danes 
have the right to free public health, education, pensions, childcare, and job training. 
The robust system is fueled by relatively high taxes (at an average income tax of at 
least 50%). When comparing it to other nations (see Figure 2), Denmark has 
mastered the welfare state model. Despite the high taxes, Denmark has still 
managed to have the lowest unemployment rate and the highest average per-capita 
income.88 Denmark has also stood out in more ways than just the economic realm. 
Denmark has been coined “the happiest country in the world”, with all the other 
Scandinavian countries following close behind. A scientist who developed the poll 
commented, “The Scandinavian countries do really well. One theory why is that they 
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have their basic needs taken care of to a higher degree than other countries. When 
we look at all the data, those basic needs explain the relationship between income 
and well-being."89 There seems to be a correlation to strong welfare systems and 
general happiness among citizens. 
 
Figure 290 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Danish welfare system has been accepted as an anomaly. The obvious question 
has been raised: why has it worked so well? The most prevailing answer is that the 
“welfare state was designed on the basis of a culturally similar citizenry, and the 
Danish economy has successfully adapted to a variety of international challenges by 
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taking advantage of institutions built around a powerful sense of civic solidarity.” 91 
It is commonly contended that the success of the welfare state is attributed to the 
homogeneity that has defined Danish cultural, language, morals, religion, ethnicity, 
and familial tendencies.  
The Danish identity, when defined by “homogeneity and equality, have come 
to be seen as obstacles to integration. Immigrants are now seen as an unwelcome 
presence because cultural assimilation has been more difficult than originally 
expected.”92 While there is an obvious historical context to the strong identity, the 
sense of nationalism has been enhanced within Denmark in recent years. This has 
resulted in a hardening of the Danish identity, which has proven to create an even 
larger obstacle for integration. As previously mentioned, the Danish identity is one 
of the strongest weapons of the DF and they often exploit it to invoke their 
constituents.  
3.4   The Social and Economic Standing of Immigrants: 
 The shortfall of immigrant integration has had various consequences in 
Denmark. “Issue of migrant ‘otherness’ and ‘compatibility’ loom large in Danish 
migrant discourse, but a more important factor is, as formulated by one Danish 
researcher, that there is ‘money between Danes and immigrants’”.93 What seems to 
be a changing trend is that migrants are no longer accused of taking jobs away from 
Danes, but rather not working at all. This is been attributed to a serious lapse in the 
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Danish integration policy, “When immigration to Denmark increased in the 1990’s it 
was left to the social security system to sort out the issues. Migrant integration 
policy became social policy, and migrants became clients in the Danish welfare 
system.”94 In some cases, the generous welfare system has blocked the incentive for 
immigrants to take lower paying jobs, because, often, more can be gained from 
collecting unemployment than working a low-skilled job. This lack of involvement in 
the workplace hinders migrant integration even more.  
 Unlike some Southern European countries that have experienced a more 
recent influx of immigration, Denmark’s immigrant population is mostly second-
generation. Thus, satellite cities, or ghettoes, have emerged and immigrants have 
established themselves outside of Danish society. Communities have recreated 
aspects of their countries of origin (for example ‘bazaars’) within Denmark that 
conflict with what is considered “Danish”. Many of these communities have become 
fully self-sufficient, in the sense that they do not need to leave them in order to 
survive. Satellite markets, schools, places of worship, and community organizations 
now exist that are often exclusively used by first or second-generation immigrants. 
The immigrants did not intentionally create these external communities; they were 
a result of a shortfall in integration.  
 In 1999 a new law was passed that delegated the responsibilities of 
integration to municipalities. According to the ‘Ministry of Immigrants, Refugees, 
and Integration’, municipalities have been given the task to “secure the related 
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religious and cultural life on equal footing with other citizens and to contribute to 
newly arrived foreigners quickly becoming self-supporting and acquiring an 
understanding of Danish society’s fundamental values and norms.”95 Two aspects of 
this goal have been highlighted as critical. First, is being part of a Danish community. 
“Ghettoes of any kind are by definition against the Danish self-perception of a 
cohesive community.”96 Secondly, immigrants must be encouraged to immediately 
participate in the collective community, that is they must adopt the egalitarian ideal. 
A popular slogan has become: “yde for man kan nyde”—“you have to contribute 
before you can enjoy”.97  
3.5   The Danish Cartoon Fiasco: 
 In September 2005 the Danish Newspaper Jyllands-Posten published a series 
of editorial cartoons that depicted the prophet Muhammad, the most important 
figure of the Muslim religion. This immediately was protested by Muslims 
throughout the Islamic world and escalated to violence and death threats towards 
the artist, Kurt Westergaards, who created a particularly controversial image 
dubbed ‘the bomb in the turban cartoon’. Despite the uproar and demand of an 
apology, the Jyllands-Posten refused to retract the cartoons and in fact defended 
them. The cultural editor for the newspaper, Flemming Rose, published an article in 
the Washington Post commenting on the issue in February 2006:  
“The modern, secular society is rejected by some Muslims. They demand a 
special position, insisting on special consideration of their own religious 
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feelings. It is incompatible with contemporary democracy and freedom of 
speech, where one must be ready to put up with insults, mockery and 
ridicule…The cartoonists treated Islam the same way they treat Christianity, 
Buddhism, Hinduism and other religions. And by treating Muslims in 
Denmark as equals they made a point: We are integrating you into the Danish 
tradition of satire because you are part of our society, not strangers. The 
cartoons are including, rather than excluding, Muslims.”98 
In defense of the cartoons, Rose contends that this kind of mockery has at some 
point targeted many other demographic groups and by excluding Muslims only 
enhances their “difference”. This outlook on the situation does not necessarily 
consider the fact that Muslims are already separated from society and their 
difference is apparent. Critics of the cartoons have labeled them xenophobic and 
representative of the racism towards the Danish minority. After much delay, in 2010 
the Jyllands-Posten issued an apology to anyone they may have offended by the  
publishing of the cartoons but the crisis has ensued. There has been an 
assassination attempt of Kurt Westergaard and an attempted bombing of the 
Jyllands-Posten offices in Copenhagen. To this day, Danish Muslims remain bitter 
about the publication of contemptuous depiction of Muhammad and Danes remain 
defensive of the rights to free speech.  
3.6   Conclusion on Denmark: 
 Denmark has been unable to successfully integrate immigrants into society 
to the degree in which both parties are satisfied. The fortitude of the Danish identity 
has been recognized as an inhibitor of integration. The Danish identity is not 
necessarily defined by specific attributes, but rather it has a historical context of 
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communitarianism that is impossible for a newcomer to immediately relate to. 
Homogeneity and equality are seen to be the fixatives of the Danish identity. These 
aspects went virtually unchallenged until the influx of immigrants in the 1970’s. The 
acute increase of Middle Eastern migrants in the 1990’s instilled a sense of anxiety 
and fear of loosing the solidarity of Danish society. For some Danes there are 
ineluctable differences between the native Danish population and the recent 
newcomers. These societal inconsistencies include language, ethnicity, morals, and 
religion. In the past decade religion has become the paramount issue that is 
associated with the immigration debate.  
Political and social factions have emerged to combat this reordering of 
Danish society. The Danish People’s Party has established themselves as anti-
immigration agency and has gone so far as to explicitly classify Muslims in Denmark 
as particularly problematic. Despite claims of racism and xenophobia, the DF has 
gained a lot of support in recent years and has been in a position of power and 
influence in parliament. Immigration and integration are seen as dually important 
issues and are both seen as integral parts to a solution. In the past decade the 
approach has been to limit immigration and enhance integration. The immigration 
policies have been tightened and are now some of the strictest in Europe. The 
integration policies have transformed from a multicultural framework to 
assimilation based policies. Danes have been relatively clear in that they are not 
interested in Denmark becoming a multi-ethnic, multi-religion, multicultural nation. 
What this has resulted in is the formation of satellite communities that are 
commonly denoted as ghettos. This has exacerbated the issue of integration. 
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CHAPTER 4: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Through the observations of the immigration narratives throughout Europe, 
connections and general trends can be made identified. A nations colonial 
involvement has more of an impact in modern society than is often recognized. 
Nations with a colonial past have had cultural and economic engagements with the 
Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and other colonized regions. Regions that were colonized 
often were inhabited by a number of European citizens from the patriarchal 
countries. These citizens were exposed to “exotic” and unknown cultural customs, 
religions, ethnicities, languages, fashions, and the list could go on. Europeans would 
travel to and from the colonies bringing with them accounts and artifacts that were 
intriguing. Eventually, the Europeans became accustomed to these notions of the 
colonies and, in a sense, the culture of the colonies had a place in European society. 
The period of decolonization, though, had a much more significant effect. Former 
colonial subjects were often granted some degree of citizenship in the country of the 
colonial power. European nations not only had the cultural influence of the colonies 
but the populations to match. Some countries even “welcomed” former colonials but 
this sentiment was most likely insincere and provoked by “colonial guilt”.  
The Spanish empire extended their influence through territories along the 
Ivory coast, in North Africa, across the Middle East, and all the way out to the East 
Indies beginning in the 16th century, but by the time of decolonization in the mid-
20th century, Spain had few colonies left. Thus, Spain’s “colonial guilt” is not as 
prominent as countries such as Belgium or Great Britain. Despite Spain’s absence in 
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the later colonial period, there was a great deal of cultural accumulation that has 
contributed to the Spanish cultural identity as still exists today. Further, based on 
Spain’s geographical location there has been more exposure to these African and 
Middle Eastern regions. What resulted was an overlap, or spill over, of certain 
aspects such language, architecture, and religion. These kinds of cultural 
contributions are true for many Southern European countries, such as Italy and 
Greece.  
Denmark on the other hand, had a very small colonial legacy compared to 
other European nations. This is very telling of the homogeneity and uniqueness of 
culture and identity in Denmark. Danes did not go and resettle in Africa and return 
home to share their experience. Denmark has no colonial guilt; they do not feel as if 
they “owe” anyone a piece of their society. The lack of a colonial past in Denmark, 
and in fact throughout Scandinavia, has largely contributed to a notion of cultural 
and social exclusion that has become evident in their parts of their societies. 
Further, Denmark does not have the geographical circumstances of many Southern 
European countries that have exposed the nations to unconventional cultural 
experiences. These cultural attributes tend to be much more “exotic” than in South 
Europe, especially if a nation had no exposure through colonialism. 
Another important factor that contributes to a countries integration model is 
the age of the immigration movement into the country. Northern Europe 
experienced an economic boom in the 1960’s that brought a significant amount of 
laborers and immigrants. Following this labor migration, family reunification 
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contributed greatly to the foreigner population. Countries, such as Denmark, that 
started immigration in the 1960’s are now dealing with a second generation of 
immigrants. This means immigrants have had time to establish themselves within or 
outside of society. The longevity of this issue has caused various outcomes. One 
consequence is the formation of satellite cities. Within these satellite cities informal 
economies, informal places of worship, and informal educational institutions have 
been established. A positive implication of second-generation immigrants is that 
some have been very successful in establishing themselves within the Danish 
society. This includes holding political positions, positions in higher education, and 
managerial positions in prominent firms. There also has been discourse addressing 
the immigration and integration for close to 20 years now. Legislation has been 
passed and revised multiple times as a solution is sought out. Countries that have 
second-generation immigrants are much more adept in the discourse immigration 
and integration policies, but this does not mean that they have created more 
effective policies.  
Denmark fits this mold in most respects as it is has been a country active of 
immigration for over 35 years. Spain, on the other hand, experienced an economic 
boom in the 2000’s, which has caused the majority of the migrant population in 
Spain to be fairly new, and mostly first-generation. Because of this, many of the 
aspects mentioned in the above paragraph do not apply to Spain and other countries 
with a majority of first- generation immigrants. While immigrant communities have 
been established (many prominent examples can be seen in Barcelona) they are not 
necessarily considered satellite cities. There also has been less of a chance for 
 45
immigrants, especially migrant workers, to establish themselves in elite circles of 
society.  
Spain has not developed coherent migration and integration policies and to 
this day there is still a lot of confusion and inconsistences within the system. There 
are many structural differences between countries that have first-generation and 
second-generation foreigners, but the line cant necessarily be drawn north and 
south in Europe. What can be deduced is that countries that experienced an 
economic boom in the post-war period tend to have more second-generation 
foreigners than those countries that did not. 
While both Spain and Denmark are “constitutional monarchies” the true 
projections of their government and political systems are very different. As 
explained, Denmark has a very strong welfare system and is socialist in some ways. 
They have a functioning democracy and a strong sense of pride towards their royal 
family. The parliament has an assortment of parties, many of which have contrasting 
views, especially in the context of the immigration debate. Denmark’s divide on the 
issue remains within the Parliament. While the emergence of the Danish People’s 
Party has bisected the Parliament, there was never a failure to draft legislation and 
closely monitor the progression and changes of the integration issue.  
Spain has a centralized national government and is divided into autonomous 
states, all which have their own parliament and regional government. In some cases 
there is a remarkable chasm national government and the autonomous states, which 
has hindered the effectuation of a sound integration policy. The issue of immigration 
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is in the hands of the national government. They have the sole power to set and 
adjust immigration laws and regulations. The issue of integration has been 
delegated to the autonomous communities. It is apparent that the processes of 
immigration and integration are reliant on each other and, further, successful 
integration of foreigners is nearly impossible without a corresponding immigration 
structure. In Spain, the integration policies have generally been reactive and are 
guided by the immigration policies. The Spanish national government has constantly 
adjusted immigration policies to cater to the changing needs in labor, and in turn the 
states have constantly adjusted integration policies to cater to the changing number 
of migrants.   
While all the above-mentioned aspects have considerable gravity, there is 
one other feature that seems to have the most weight in determining immigration 
and integration affairs. The sense of national identity is perhaps the most important 
indicator. The different structures of governance and leadership are truly 
representative of the nation’s conception of their national identity. It is difficult to 
say which is a function of which. Is the fragmented government in Spain a result of 
strong identities of the autonomous states, or have the states developed strong 
regional identities because of a lack of a national identity? In Denmark it seems like 
the national identity is consistent with the strong political foundation of the welfare 
state. Is it possible that importance of the welfare state has been emphasized within 
the immigration and integration debate and has potentially depicted the national 
identity to be more predominant that it actually is? The key question about the 
Danish identity is if it has been created on the foundation of Danish heritage and 
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inflated by the deeply rooted homogeneity of the country, or has the identity been 
mostly fabricated as a means of comparison to the ‘newcomer’ or ‘other’.  
 The largest impediment in my research was commenting on integration 
through the lens of lived experience. Obviously, each individual will have their own 
account and opinion about how open the country is to the integration of new 
comers. I had to keep in mind that each account was from the view point of one 
individual with their own personal history that effected their opinion. While reading 
many of these kinds of reports was insightful, I was unable to use them as fact and 
used them more to understand the general essence of the situation. This is why is 
examining this issue from the policy angle was most effective. To fill in for the 
commentary on the lived experience I used information from certain studies and 
institutions that have had the opportunity to conduct very extensive research on the 
effectiveness of these integration policies based off of the lived experience of 
migrants. The Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), first established in 2004, 
is an “on-going monitoring and assessment tool”99 that has studied and evaluated 31 
countries in many main aspects of integration. MIPEX scores and ranks countries on 
their overall integration by focusing on 7 key strands: Anti-discrimination, Access 
To Nationality, Long Term Residence, Political Participation, Education, Family 
Reunion, and Labor Market Mobility. The MIPEX is strongly endorsed by many 
policy makers who support the research and in turn use the MIPEX findings to 
adjust their own policies.  
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CONCLUSION 
 Migration is a human experience that has been present in within society 
since the beginning of time. It is not a new phenomenon, nor is it at all unfamiliar. 
The question is then raised, why has immigration caused such turmoil in the past 50 
years? Globalization has undoubtedly increased the mobility of everything, including 
people but the problem is not caused by globalization alone. The rise of Islam has 
been ascribed as especially problematic to the issue of immigration. Islamic 
extremists have instilled a false sense of incompatibility of Islamic culture and 
European culture. While many recognize the rarity of such extremists, the tragedies 
in Madrid, London, and of course, New York City have severely tainted the global 
image of Muslims. Astonishingly, it has been observed that post-11M there was 
virtually no backlash against the Muslim community in Spain. But, on the contrary, 
in many countries, including Denmark, there has been a call for a barrier between 
the European world and the Islamic world. Political factions have emerged, 
discrimination has been heightened, and culturally controversial material has been 
published (two prominent examples are Theo van Gogh and Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s movie 
Submission, and Kurt Westergaards’s Muhammed cartoon). I originally intended for 
my thesis to address the issues of Muslim integration in Europe, its difficulties, and 
then draw my project to a close with a possible solution. Through my research I 
have learned quite a few things that complicated my intentional thesis. First, there is 
a very fine line between a general immigrant issue and a Muslim immigrant issue. 
Each country is different and within each country there have been different 
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sentiments about this throughout time. Secondly, the problems impeding successful 
integration are not easily identified. There are problems at the policy level, and 
there is a whole different set of problems at the societal level. There is no way to 
measure or control the level of integration on the individual level. The third 
realization I made was that a single solution is impossible to produce. Each country, 
each community has a different historical narrative that has a lot to do with the 
experience of immigrant integration. The issue of Muslim integration, and 
integration as a whole does not have one congruent solution and to propose one 
would be naïve.  
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